![]() ![]() ‘ Fumerton's principle of inferential justification, skepticism, and the nature of inference’, Journal of Philosophical Research, 33 ( 2008), 215– 234 CrossRef Google Scholar), extreme scepticism follows unless the scope of inferential justification is suitably restricted and room is made for non-inferential justification of appearance claims apart from any positive evidential connection. ![]() As discussions of the latter have made clear (see Rhoda, Alan R. There is a parallel between Wykstra's insistence on the need for a positive evidential connection between what one is inclined to believe and the cognized situation inclining one to believe it and Richard Fumerton's ‘principle of inferential justification’ see his Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995). Wykstra, Stephen in‘ The Humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering: on avoiding the evils of “appearance”’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 16 ( 1984), 73– 93 CrossRef Google Scholar, famously argues that none of the world's evils, no matter how horrendous, constitute even prima facie evidence against theism. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |